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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines the consequences of terrorism for tourism with particular 
reference to the hotel industry and the case of Singapore. Terrorist activity is 
shown to have adverse impacts for destinations where it occurs and hotels to 
be attractive targets for attacks. The risks are recognised and management is 
attempting to secure properties against damage. Such a task can be daunting 
and is illustrated by a discussion of circumstances in Singapore based on 
information collected from hotel security managers and other experts there. 
There is a need for constant vigilance. Tools to combat terrorism directed 
at hotels are both technological and human and internal and external 
communications, cooperation and collaboration have an important part to play 
in effective resistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The tourism industry worldwide has been significantly affected by the threat of 
terrorism and instances of terrorist attacks in the modern era.  Hotels, which serve 
a core function as suppliers of tourist accommodation and other amenities, are 
attractive targets and management has been forced to review and revise security 
measures accordingly. This paper is concerned with issues of terrorism and 
tourism with specific reference to hotels in Singapore and aims to afford insights 
into risks and responses within a wider context. 
 After an explanation of the methodology, an account of recent trends in 
terrorism and the consequences for tourism are presented. Terrorist actions 
represent a potential crisis for the industry and the vulnerability of hotels is 
summarised in a separate section. Some background information about Singapore 
is then provided in order to set the scene for the discussion which follows the 
results of a series of interviews with hotel security managers and other experts 
there.  
 The findings reveal a belief that Singapore hotels are well equipped 
technologically to deal with what is regarded as a real possibility of a terrorist 
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strike, but that there is no room for complacency. There are some concerns about 
human resources and a feeling that a more security conscious culture should 
be cultivated. Improved recruitment and further training to enhance security 
awareness and skills amongst employees are needed. While technology is 
essential, its effectiveness is determined by the people who use it and security 
is the responsibility of all staff. Communication, cooperation and collaboration 
within the industry and with external stakeholders, and especially government 
agencies are also crucial to success in coping with terrorism. 
METHODOLOGY
The original intention was to interview at least ten security managers from a 
selection of Singapore’s superior standard hotels affiliated to international chains 
in order to gain information about hotel and corporate attitudes towards terrorism 
and action on security. Unfortunately, perhaps owing to the sensitivity of the 
topic, only four hotels agreed to participate. Even then, there was a reluctance 
to disclose facts about hotel security measures and a preference for talking more 
generally from a strategic and management stance. 
 Given the disappointing response, it was decided to extend the interviews 
to a professional from the national security industry institute and an academic 
with expertise in facility management and design. Questions posed related to 
the likelihood of a terrorist attack on Singapore hotels and experience of such 
situations; security policy, implementation and monitoring; relations with external 
agencies; and principal challenges. Interviews were conducted in person and 
lasted about one hour. Despite the limitations of the material, it was judged that 
sufficient and suitable data had been collected for the purpose of an exploratory 
study.
TERRORISM, TOURISM AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Terrorism is something of a disputed concept which is open to differing 
interpretations regarding motives and causes. Nevertheless, it can be broadly 
defined as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience’ (US Department of State, 2004). Objectives of terrorists range 
from gaining attention through provoking an official reaction to the ousting and 
replacement of incumbent regimes (Crenshaw, 1981). Commentators suggest a 
rise in deaths and injuries due to terrorism in recent decades with intensification in 
the scale of attacks, although the number has not necessarily increased (Thackrah, 
2004). Terrorists have become more ambitious and less confined by geographical 
boundaries, exploiting the latest technologies to their advantage (Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Office, 2004; Sonmez & Grafe, 1998). While violent aggression 
appears to be the preferred method, there is scope for other types of terrorism such 
as hacking into computers, food poisoning and release of toxic chemicals.
 Another trend has been an expansion in the role of terrorism perpetrated in 
the name of religion, illustrated by Al-Qaeda and its actions (Sedgewick, 2004). 
The movement is dedicated to pursuing its version of global jihad (commonly and 
misleadingly translated as holy war), the establishment of an Islamic theocracy and 
obliteration of contrary world views. Al-Qaeda has been described as a component 
of a fourth wave of terrorism which is distinguished by religious extremism and 
suicide bombings (Ludes, 2004). Animosity has been focused on the USA, fuelled 
by the 2003 war in Iraq and its aftermath, but encompasses America’s supporters 
in the conflict and the West and its allies in general. Numerous groups have linked 
themselves to Al-Qaeda in a loose network which includes Jemaah Islamiah (JI). 
JI is associated with South East Asia and carried out the bombings of two Bali 
nightclubs in 2002 when 191 died and over 300 were injured (Henderson 2003). 
Terrorists usually seek maximum publicity for their acts and the amount of media 
exposure received is partly an outcome of the volume of fatalities. They therefore 
often concentrate on spaces and buildings where crowds gather, especially 
those which are unsecured and deemed to be soft (Siaw & Loosemore, 2006), 
and public transport services and termini. Global news coverage is likely to be 
greater if foreign nationals are hurt or killed and tourists and tourist facilities 
thus make tempting targets (Dimanche, 2004).  Tourists are also representatives 
of their country of origin so violence against them can be a means of expressing 
opposition to foreign governments and their policies. The economic importance 
of tourism also makes it relevant to terrorists as a sudden decline in revenues 
and employment can have destabilising repercussions for destination economies, 
societies and politics which could hasten realisation of terrorist goals. As a result, 
terrorism and tourism can be said to have a close relationship with hijackings, 
bombings, shootings and kidnappings all directed at tourists (Pizam & Fleischer, 
2002; Sonmez, 1998). 
 Tourists and the tourism industry have also exhibited resilience and some 
researchers assert that tourists may not be unduly worried about terrorism (Larsen, 
Brun and Øgaard, 2009). However, opinions and recovery from a terrorist-
related tourism crisis depend upon the way affairs are managed and subsequent 
developments. Repeated cases and an official failure to act decisively will seriously 
depress demand in the long term. In other circumstances, society may indeed be 
more tolerant of the threat of terrorism because of familiarity and adaptation as 
well as the desire to demonstrate defiance. Common sense additionally tells us 
that the chance of an individual tourist being caught up in terrorism is extremely 
remote and risks should be put into perspective, although this can be difficult in 
view of the intense media attention to any such stories which heightens feelings 
of danger with a lingering effect (Henderson, 2007). 
 Despite a degree of popular resistance, terrorism constitutes a possible crisis 
of great magnitude for the tourism industry. It has the potential to unsettle a 
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country’s government, precipitate widespread fear, disrupt daily operations and 
engender negative emotions and unfavourable destination images. There are also 
practical problems of insurance and many underwriters exclude terrorism from 
their corporate and personal cover. Planning to avoid such situations, or at least 
minimise damage should they occur, thus becomes imperative and the topic of 
tourism crisis management is generating its own literature about the dynamics of 
crises and how they can best be handled (Faulkner, 2001; Paraskevas & Arendall, 
2008; Ritchie, 2004). Full exploration of these themes is beyond the remit of 
this paper, but it is clear that the capacity of terrorism to provoke a tourism crisis 
cannot be dismissed. Hotels are very exposed to the threat in a manner which is 
outlined below.
HOTELS AS TERRORIST TARGETS   
Terrorist incidents at destinations can have very harmful impacts on the hotel sector 
as a whole if there are dramatic falls in arrivals (Stafford, Yu and Arnoo, 2002) 
and the financial and less tangible costs to individual properties are acute when 
they are the scene of the outrage. Hotels have a history of being targeted, some 
in popular holiday centres and others in troubled states where guests are mainly 
citizens and foreigners travelling for business or official purposes. Locations of 
such strikes are worldwide in a pattern which reflects evolving domestic and 
international political conditions. Notable examples in the past few years are a 
car bomb at the Marriott Hotel in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta in 2003 which 
left 13 dead and 100 wounded and suicide bombings which killed at least 67 and 
injured almost 150 in the Radisson SAS, Days Inn and Grand Hyatt hotels in 
Amman, Jordan, in 2005. 
 The susceptibility of hotels was made apparent most recently in the Indian 
city of Mumbai through an assault by terrorists belonging to a Pakistani-based 
organisation which commenced in the late evening of 26 November 2008. The 
Oberoi-Trident and Taj Mahal Palace, luxury hotels much visited by foreign 
businessmen as well as more affluent Indian nationals and celebrities, were both 
occupied. Shooting began immediately and there were grenade explosions with 
fires reported in the Taj. There were running battles between the terrorists and 
army on the second day and much confusion about what was happening. Some 
guests managed to escape while others, several of whom were later murdered, 
were taken hostage or tried to hide within the hotel. Commandoes finally took 
control of the Oberoi on the morning of 28 November and the Taj siege was 
declared over early on 29 November (BBC News, 2008). A total of 52 staff and 
guests died at the Oberoi and 32 at the Taj, including the wife and two sons of the 
latter’s General Manager.
 The hotels closed until 21 December when less damaged sections re-
opened with a multi-faith prayer ceremony at the Oberoi and reception at the 
modern Tower Wing of the Taj. Hotel representatives hailed the occasion as a 
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testament of the staff and city’s courage and strength. Security was very tight with 
armed police on patrol, but questions were being asked about the lack of 
preparedness and lax security prior to the attack. There were accusations that 
warnings had been ignored by city authorities and hotel management (The 
Times Online, 2008). Business was also badly hit, with Mumbai hotel prices 
dropping by 41% in the last quarter of 2008 (Indian Hotelier, 2009), and return 
to normality or near-normality will be a long term process. Repairs are expected 
to take at least a year at a cost of INR5 billion in the case of the Taj where the 
Heritage Wing, a historic building over one hundred years old, had been the 
terrorists’ stronghold.
 Reasons for targeting hotels are that they offer a high degree of access, 
usually 24 hours a day. Larger hotels have many public spaces and entrances and 
exits and foreigners may gather there (Horner & Swarbrooke, 2004). Meetings 
and conferences, sometimes prestigious, are hosted and there are restaurants 
which might be frequented by prominent businessmen and government officials. 
Properties which are part of international chains, often American owned, are a 
symbol of that country and its government. Security is unlikely to have been a 
guiding principle in the architecture of most hotels and certain features such as 
grand lobbies and spacious entrances are vulnerable to individual suicide and car 
bombings. Striking architectural designs are not always the most secure and hotels 
in towering skyscrapers pose formidable challenges as do resorts with sprawling 
grounds.  Guests may be lulled into a false sense of safety once inside the hotel 
and overlook suspicious behaviour and objects. Certain city hotels may also be 
disadvantaged by unsafe environs and proximity to other notable targets such as 
embassies, and shopping malls.
 Security is an awkward topic for many tourism businesses, including hotels, 
with a feeling that publicising measures could negate their effectiveness. There 
are also reservations about inciting unfounded fears and losing custom as a result. 
However, awareness of risks and the importance of security amongst practitioners 
and society at large have risen since September 2001. The civil aviation industry, 
for example, has been compelled to take unprecedented steps at considerable 
inconvenience to passengers in a bid to thwart terrorism in the air. There is an 
appreciation in other tourism sectors that tourists are cognisant of hazards and want 
assurance that safeguards have been installed (Tarlow, 2007). In an indication of 
the changing climate, hotels have borrowed ideas from airlines and airports such 
as checking of vehicles, inspection of luggage and screening of people by metal 
detectors. Questions of security are now spoken about more openly and there 
are signs of a greater willingness to engage in dialogue and share good practice 
(Hotels, 2003).
 The USA appears to be taking the lead with debate in public and private 
domains. The Overseas Security Advisory Council of the Department of State’s 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security reported in 2006 how American companies 
operating overseas were devising checklists to rate hotels on the basis of their 
security (OSAC, 2006). Real estate investors were also called on by a US Senate 
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hearing to reflect on lessons to be learnt from Mumbai (Harwood, 2009). Experts 
concurred that building managers should focus on liaison with officials to 
obtain up to date intelligence about terrorism and act upon it without delay. 
Police and other relevant parties should be given building plans so they can 
intervene quickly in an emergency. Site hardening is crucial together with training 
specifically for terrorism, flexible procedures and crisis management planning. 
Another observer of experiences in Mumbai commented on the significance of 
surveillance and unpredictable security routines as the terrorists had apparently 
visited the hotels to familiarise themselves with layouts and arrangements 
(Spadanuta, 2009).
 However, many techniques such as protective barriers, surveillance, 
identification of employees and alarm systems are essentially reactive. It also 
should not be forgotten that terrorists too are becoming more sophisticated 
in their methods and harnessing of technologies. Given these factors, it has 
been argued that one of the most potent security stratagems is to incorporate 
prevention into building design. However, this is not an option for hotels 
which have already been constructed and adds to the development costs of new 
properties. Terrorism is a ‘low probability-high impact risk’, making expensive 
investment of this kind hard to justify in most instances (Siaw & Loosemore, 
2006, p. 161).
 Research into hotel security has been limited to date, but work completed 
suggests that hotels commonly strive to create an environment which is both 
welcoming and secure against assorted manifestations of criminality (Gill, Moon, 
Seaman and Turbin, 2002). This is not an easy task and there are conflicts between 
the offering and denying of hospitality which must be reconciled. Security may 
upset customers if it is deemed to be over-intrusive and an invasion of privacy so 
should be discreet, although an obvious presence can be a deterrent. Providing 
adequate security is also made more difficult by the tendency for some hotels 
to have a diversity of amenities alongside accommodation. Policy and practice 
are thus influenced by a range of variables and major influences are location, 
design, the General Manager’s attitude and the Security Manager’s background 
(Groeneboom & Jones, 2003). Trying to protect a hotel against terrorism clearly 
presents dilemmas for management and circumstances in Singapore are explored 
after the presentation of some information about the country pertinent to the 
discussion. 
SINGAPORE IN CONTEXT
The Republic of Singapore is a modern and cosmopolitan city state and a major 
Asian commercial centre and trading port. It is home to offices of the world’s 
major financial companies and popular with both leisure and business travellers. 
In excess of 10 million visitors and almost S$14billion in spending were recorded 
in 2007 (STB, 2008) prior to the onset of the global recession which has since 
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dampened demand. Tourism has benefited from the international air connectivity 
afforded by the award winning Changi Airport and the country’s location allows 
it to function as a regional transport hub. The stock of conventional tourism 
attractions is restricted, but authorities have invested heavily in various man-
made projects and there are high standard BTMICE facilities. Most of the leading 
hotel chains are represented and two integrated resorts incorporating casinos, 
one oriented towards the BTMICE market and the other to holidaymakers, will 
augment the supply of hotel rooms when fully operational. 
 The country is well known for its order, efficiency and economic progress 
and achievements are credited to the People’s Action Party (PAP) and its founder. 
The PAP has been in office since the first post-independence elections in 1968 and 
governs in a way which has produced a high degree of prosperity and stability 
(EIU, 2009). Its approach includes inculcating a unifying sense of national identity 
intended to avert discord amongst the different ethnic communities which make 
up a population of over four million. Those of Chinese origin comprised 75% of 
the total in 2007 and Malays and Indians represented 13.7% and 8.7% respectively 
(Statistics Singapore, 2009). The constitution provides for freedom of worship 
and political parties based on race are banned, but there has been censure of the 
marginalisation of the non-Chinese (Rahim, 1998) and racial tensions persist 
beneath a surface of harmonious multiculturalism. 
 The above considerations indicate that Singapore is likely to be viewed as a 
highly desirable or ‘trophy’ target by terrorists. At the same time, the characteristics 
of the government and the reach of state institutions into many aspects of life 
make it hard for them to succeed and there have been few cases of terrorism in 
the past. In one of the rare examples, four hijackers of a Singapore Airlines plane 
were killed during a rescue operation at Changi in 1991. More recently, a JI cell 
was uncovered in 2001 and 38 suspects were arrested. According to officials, they 
had been preparing to attack a series of venues (Kader, 2007), several of which 
were connected to American interests. Elements of Singapore’s foreign policy 
render it an apt choice for anti-Western sabotage and analysts concur that it is not 
immune from terrorism with particular fears about a resurgence of JI (EIU, 2009; 
Kader, 2007). 
 In any assessment of risk, it must be remembered that Singapore is part 
of the wider region and is inevitably affected by regional weaknesses, however 
efficient its own system of government. Parts of South East Asia are prone to 
political instability and insecurity. Terrorists allied to JI and Al-Qaeda are active 
in Indonesia and the Philippines and there have been clashes between Muslims 
and non-Muslims along the Thai-Malaysian border. Endeavours to combat 
terrorism require political commitment and resources which some countries do 
not possess. Even in Singapore, there can be mistakes and a prominent JI member 
escaped from a detention centre there in early 2008 and was not recaptured until 
2009. Such are the facts and forces which must be taken into account by all those 
involved in the republic’s hotel industry when formulating policies on security, 
the subject of the remainder of the paper.
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THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AND SECURITY REGIMES
All the parties consulted admitted that the threat of terrorism in Singapore was 
real, but none of the individuals or the hotels in which they were employed had 
direct experience of an incident. The country’s cultural composition, economic 
infrastructure, stage of tourism development and political ties with the West 
were cited as reasons for its vulnerability. It was mentioned that, although ethnic 
diversity meant vibrancy and despite the government’s insistence on racial 
tolerance, there was still some mistrust which terrorist groups could exploit. The 
nation’s role as a financial hub, dependence on trade and foreign investment and 
popularity as a tourist destination also made it interesting to terrorists and hotels 
were agreed to be soft spots.
 Security regimes were shaped by the location of a hotel and its surroundings, 
directives from head office and autonomous hotel management decisions. 
Nevertheless, security managers identified similar tools that were vital to their 
work such as closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs).  For hotels with extensive 
open compounds or many corners, CCTVs acted as the eyes of security officers 
and were repositories of evidence in the event of anything untoward. Fire drills 
were mandatory and believed to help familiarise staff with escape routes and 
maintain order during an actual emergency.  Timings were documented to monitor 
performance and facilitate the speediest of evacuations.
 In terms of human resources, the recruitment of security staff was a key 
area for attention. Officers were seen to have numerous duties and heavy 
responsibilities. They had to be certified in carrying out medical procedures such 
as first-aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation and automated external defibrillator 
rescue. Recruits also had to be cleared by the Security Industry Regulatory 
Department, an arm of the Singapore Police Force, to confirm that they had no 
criminal record. Training in security measures and their execution was not only 
necessary for security officers, but all employees. Managers tried to cultivate 
understanding of the thinking behind policies and security was reviewed during 
morning briefings and management meetings.   
 Security had been revised and generally tightened after 11 September 2001. 
New measures included the installation of additional surveillance cameras, 
increased checks at public and staff entrances and verification of guests before the 
re-issuing of room key cards. Key card access to guestroom floors had not been 
an industry norm in Singapore, but was gradually being adopted. Extra workshops 
on security had also been organised post-2001.  The overall aim was to develop 
a culture in which employees saw themselves as partners of security officers in 
detection and enforcement.  Interviewees spoke of the need for all staff to be alert 
and eager to report any suspicions. A team of pro-active individuals was itself a 
critical weapon against terrorism at the hotel and complemented technological 
instruments.    
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COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION 
Security managers favoured a two-pronged approach in which clear and concise 
communication about security was coupled with efficient implementation. 
Internally, initial transmission of information occurred during employee orientation 
sessions and was followed by updates about changes to current practice and trends 
across the industry.  Crisis manuals describing security measures and emergency 
evacuation arrangements were also distributed. Staff members were encouraged 
to comment on and suggest improvements to existing policies as well as be aware 
of the terrorist situation within the country and region. Across the industry in 
Singapore, there was a security network of about 30 managers that convened 
monthly to share information.
 A significant stakeholder was the government and its agencies and all hotels 
belonged to a Safety and Security Watch Group, a formal initiative whereby 
security managers met with police bi-monthly to receive news about security. 
The government had worked with the Singapore Hotel Association and police 
to launch a national standard for hotel security in 2005. The publication was 
entitled the Technical Reference for Security Management Systems for Hotels and 
contained guidelines on the installation and maintenance of equipment, provision 
of materials and information outlining procedures, employing and training 
personnel, and establishing plans and procedures (SPRING, 2005). Hotels had 
also to conform to laws and regulations; for example, fire drills had to be held 
regularly in accordance with stipulations of the Singapore Civil Defence Force. A 
Security Industry Institute existed to help train and improve the calibre of security 
staff and, in collaboration with the Ministry of Manpower, offered courses and 
certification for officers, supervisors and managers (WDA, 2009).
 All the managers applauded the endeavours of the government to 
enhance security through intelligence gathering and exchange and border and 
immigration controls.  It seemed to them that authorities were very appreciative 
of terrorist threats and conscientiously disseminated warnings to the public and 
business community urging them to be on guard.  There was a feeling that the 
regular meetings with the police and civil defence forces as well as the Internal 
Security Department were very useful. Although the threat of terrorism was 
present and demanded vigilance, the general consensus was that an appropriate 
national security framework was in place and had eased concerns of a possible 
attack.  
PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES
Interviewees identified a number of key challenges confronting those in charge 
of security against terrorism in Singapore hotels which pertained to money and 
people, technology and balancing security with other guest needs. Firstly, security 
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managers observed a predilection of hotel management to see their departments 
primarily as non-revenue generating units which had adverse consequences for 
funding. Security was at a disadvantage compared to divisions which made a more 
obvious contribution to the hotel’s competitive position and profitability. However, 
the counter-argument communicated to senior management was that security 
protected property, staff and guests and could either bolster or undermine market 
confidence should there be a terrorist attack with corresponding implications for 
revenue. 
 The second dilemma was finding the right people for the job of security 
officer, given its long hours and relatively low pay. Retirees and the less educated 
usually formed the bulk of officers and they did not always display great physical 
fitness or the best mindset which was hard to instil. In addition, there were problems 
in inspiring the proper attitude amongst all staff. It was impossible for officers 
to be omnipresent so employees should also exercise a security function, using 
their initiative to tell officers about unusual happenings and volunteer feedback on 
security systems.  Propagating such values and behaviour depended upon correct 
security education and training as well as the recruitment of suitable people. 
However, non-security employees appeared to be less engaged with security than 
managers might have wished; for example, they were not active participants in 
discussion forums despite knowing of their availability. 
 It was widely agreed that technology was an invaluable asset which could 
be used to detect dubious characters or harmful substances and deter terrorists. 
It was therefore important for hotels to be equipped with the latest technology 
and have the personnel to utilise it to optimal effect. However, technology was 
expensive and always changing. New technologies might not be compatible 
with those already in existence and instalment could be a disruptive and costly 
operation, especially in older properties. Hotel security also could not rely on 
technology alone, even state-of-the-art, but depended on the aptitude of those 
manning it.  
 Finally, the reconciliation of guest satisfaction and security imperatives 
was a predicament. It was acknowledged that hotels were first and foremost 
businesses where customers paid to have a comfortable and convenient 
experience with an appropriate level of service. This extended to security and 
guests wanted to be reassured that they were in a comparatively safe 
environment, but expected tactics to be unobtrusive. However, security could 
not be compromised for the sake of comfort and convenience and safety had 
to be maximised which meant constantly trying to strike a satisfactory balance 
between the two obligations. The duty of care also embraced casual sightseers 
at famous hotels which were visitor attractions and customers of other outlets 
in the complex. Managing access and internal movements within the hotel 
compound without marring the enjoyment of legitimate non-residents was an 
added burden for security enforcers.
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CONCLUSION  
Terrorism seems set to continue as the 21st century progresses and the hotel 
industry will remain vulnerable.  The quantity and quality of security that a 
hotel is able to provide is closely linked to the amount of funds allocated and 
while there will always be a tension between cost savings and expenditure, 
security should be given a financial priority which reflects its importance. 
Investment in the recruitment of specialist staff, education and training of all 
staff and technology in particular will determine how well hotels respond to the 
terrorist threat. In cases of new hotel construction and especially in higher risk 
locations, security should be given due consideration by planners and architects 
in their designs.   
 Attacks such as that in Mumbai will be remembered for some time and 
may be emulated by other terrorist groups, perhaps leading to tourists putting 
a greater emphasis on personal safety when choosing accommodation in the 
future. In some circumstances, this need could take precedence and, given 
mounting public awareness of terrorism, security could become a component 
of quality grading schemes. Including security measures as a criterion might 
help allay fears and demonstrate the hotel and company’s commitment to 
guest safety in a positive and non-alarmist fashion. However, guarding against 
complacency is crucial and hotel managers should keep abreast of incidents 
worldwide, learn from the shortcomings of others and take appropriate steps 
to reduce the chances of a similar occurrence in their property. The fight 
against terrorism is also not only a matter for individual hotels and has to be 
dealt with collectively by the whole industry, governments, residents and 
tourists. 
 This paper has addressed several important questions about terrorism 
and hotels and illuminated the nature of hazards the former entails for the 
latter and policies adopted in response, but further research is necessary. 
Detailed cases of hotels and hotel companies with different experiences of 
terrorism would be instructive and comparative studies could be conducted 
across countries and regions of the world regarding hotel security provision 
and market receptivity. More knowledge about perceptions and expectations 
of security amongst hotel customers and its effects on buying behaviour 
would be especially useful for management decision making. Confidentiality is, 
however, a serious obstacle for researchers in the field and they must be prepared 
to negotiate unwillingness within the hospitality industry to reveal information 
about security regimes or the causes and consequences of their breaching by 
terrorists.
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